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In April of 2007, Estonia fell victim to a series of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks that crippled its 
government websites, email servers, media outlets, and banking system for nearly a month. Due to the devastating 
effects of these cyber attacks, Estonia took great efforts to strengthen its cyber security protocols. This research 
analyzes the reforms that Estonia has implemented in its domestic and foreign policies and attempts to determine if 
any of it systemic improvements can help to also bolster cyber security in the United States (US). The findings from 
this research are that Estonia’s policy reforms in cyber security have been the most significant in areas that the US 
currently lacks. Domestically, Estonia has a cyber education program that significantly highlights awareness of the 
risks to its critical cyber infrastructure. Estonia has also promoted public and private partnerships to jointly analyze, 
assess, and defend itself against future cyber attacks.. In foreign affairs, Estonia has bolstered its relationship with 
allied nations in new ways and has synchronized its foreign policies to improve stakeholder engagement on cyber 
defense. The critical changes that Estonia has adopted and implemented throughout the past decade are what this 
research endeavors to recommend for the US to consider into its defense of the cyber domain. Furthermore, this 
research proposes an on-ramping methodology that helps to frame how an organization can more easiliy integrate new 
processes, practices, and procedures that have worked well for others. 
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Introduction 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Republic of Estonia’s technological capabilities were virtually non-
existent. Beginning in 1992, an economic foundation established under the new Estonian Prime Minister allowed 
businesses to be created without substantial delay. By 1998, all Estonian schools had computers equipped in the 
classroom for their students. Soon afterwards, Internet access was considered a critical enabling infrastructure, and 
free Wi-Fi spread throughout the country and became the national standard. In 2007, Estonia became the first country 
to allow online voting in a general election. Today, Estonia is a world leader in technology and is considered one of 
the most wired countries in Europe (Davis, 2007). 
On April 30th 2007, pro-Russian hacktivists showcased the devastating impact that cyber effects can have 
on the world. Never before had an entire nation become rendered completely impotent due to a cyber attack. As a 
result of this unprecedented attack, cyber warfare was quickly added into the military lexicon. No longer were cyber 
attacks merely a nuisance that only banks and e-commerce sites had to contend with; the 2007 Russian cyber attacks 
on Estonia showed to the world just how dangerous and deadly a cyber adversary can be and exposed just how 
vulnerable nations are to attacks in the cyber domain (Herzog, 2011). In spite of the calamity it suffered, Estonia has 
demonstrated considerable resiliency after this attack, and the nation has helped to spur a substantial amount of 
significant improvements in cyber defense. In fact, within the span of just one decade Estonia has transitioned into 
becoming one of the most advanced nations in cyber security and cyber defense. As cyber attacks directed against 
American citizens, campanies, and the government increase, it will prove advantageous to examine the measures that 
Estonia has taken following Russia’s cyber attack towards advancing the cyber security posture of the US. By 
analyzing and benchmarking the Estonian cyber security strategy after its 2007 cyber attack, this research identifies 
key lessons learned that can be applied to improve the overall cyber security posture for all nations. Finally, this 
research proposes an on-ramping methodology that will help to better frame how any organization looking to adopt 
and implement processes, practices, and procedures that have worked well for others can do so more efficiently and 
effectively. 





As a result of a massive and sustained cyber attack on its information infrastructure by Russian hackers and in the 
aftermath of the very first cyber attack directly targeting the national security of a country, Estonia became one of the 
first countries in the world to adopt a national cyber security strategy (Czosseck, Ottis, & Taliharm, 2011). The 2007 
cyber attack directed at computers in the Estonian government, schools, and national media left the country without a 
number of essential services for nearly a month. Although some of the attacks on its system merely consisted of 
vandalism on government websites, the most serious attacks resulted in a series of distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
that left the country without access to the Internet, telephones, bank accounts, and credit cards (Czosseck, Ottis, & 
Taliharm, 2011). However, in the aftermath of this cyber attack, Estonia has implemented a number of significant 
structural changes that make it a paragon for cyber security. Accordingly, this research  shows how the US government 
can benefit greatly from by examining the creation of Estonia’s cyber defense strategy and considering the adoption 
of key parts of this strategy for US cyber security. 
 
Republic of Estonia’s Cyber Security Policy 
Estonia’s Cyber Security Strategy 2014-2017 currently guides Estonia’s cyber security program and is an integral part 
of the nation’s broader security strategy (Estonia, 2014). The document helps to highlight key developments, assesses 
cyber threats to the nation, and provides measures to manage these threats as part of a whole-of-government effort. 
This cyber security strategy is similar to the original plan that Estonia put in place immediately after the attacks in 
2007, and it continues to promote efforts that enhance the nation’s cyber security. The primary objective of this 
updated strategy is to increase cyber security capabilities and raise the population’s awareness of cyber threats, thereby 
ensuring continued confidence in cyberspace for its citizens. To do so effectively, this strategy outlines several sub-
goals which include ensuring protection of information systems underlying important services, enhancing the fight 
against cyber crime, developing national cyber defense capabilities, managing cyber security threats, and promoting 
and synchronizing international cyber security policy (Estonia, 2014). 
This cyber strategy also dedicates considerable resources on increasing its people’s understanding of cyber 
vulnerabilities. Estonia’s Police and Border Guard Board has been tasked with elevating the nation’s awareness of 
cyber threats, and as a result, has created web-constables that educate its citizens on the security of the Internet and 
help protect its children and young people with their online presence (Estonia, 2014). In addition, this strategy 
encourages greater integration between the private, public and third-party sectors in order to promote a more 
comprehensive cyber security posture. This has resulted in the creation of the Estonian Defense League’s Cyber Unit 
which is composed of cybersecurity and industry professionals who volunteer their expertise to improve the security 
of Estonian state agencies’ information systems through coordinated exercises and testing of cyber defense solutions 
(Estonia, 2014). With Estonia’s view towards enhancing relationships with allies and promoting international cyber 
security policy, partnerships have extended beyond traditional regional entities, such as NATO, the European Union, 
and the Baltic States; Estonia has created new forms of cyber cooperation such as the Freedom Online Coalition, the 
United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, and the Friends of the Presidency of the European Union in order to 
grow and synchronize mutually beneficial security policies that Estonia wants to promote (Estonia, 2014). 
 
Linkages to the Cyber Security Goals of the US Department of Defense 
In 2015, the US Department of Defense (DoD) published its updated cyber security strategy and placed cyber threats 
as the nation’s number one strategic threat (US DoD, 2015). In this document, the US DoD outlines its three three 
primary cyber missions: 1) to defend its own networks, systems, and information; 2) to be prepared to defend the US 
and its interests against cyber attacks of significant consequence; and 3) if directed by the President or the Secretary 
of Defense, it must be able to provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations and contingency 
plans (US DoD, 2015). The US DoD document also includes a number of strategic goals which include: 1) build and 
maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations; 2) defend the DoD information network and 
data as well as mitigate risks to DoD missions; 3) be prepared to defend the US homeland and US vital interests from 
disruptive or destructive cyber attacks; 4) build and maintain viable cyber options and plan to use those options to 
control conflict escalation and to shape the conflict environment at all stages; and 5) build and maintain robust 
international alliances and partnerships to deter shared threats and increase international security and stability (US 
DoD, 2015). 
As with in the Estonian strategy, the US DoD cyber strategy places considerable emphasis on international 
alliances and partnerships in order to bolster global cyber security against potential threats and states: “All three of 
DoD’s cyber missions require close collaboration with foreign allies and partners. . . and [the US] seeks to build 
partnership capacity in cybersecurity and cyber defense, and to deepen operational partnerships where appropriate” 
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(US DoD, 2015). And based on the many other similarities and overlapping goals among these two cyber strategies, 
it appears evident that the US DoD has placed meaningful stock in learning from Estonia’s experiences and is putting 
in place defensive measures that will help to prevent a cyber attack as devastating as the one inflicted upon Estonia 
from happening again.  
 
Methodology 
While Estonia endured being without a number of critical services for over 22 days after the 2007 cyber attack, a 
number of security experts question whether the US, whose dependence on the cyber domain is arguably greater than 
Estonia’s from a decade earlier, can withstand such a calamitous shock (Kaplan, 2016). “The network connectivity 
that the United States has used to tremendous advantage, economically and militarily, over the past 20 years has made 
the country more vulnerable than ever to cyber attacks,” concluded the DoD Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Resilient Military Systems (US Defense Science Board, 2013). With cyber adversaries becoming more and more 
capable of conducting such attacks and with a computer network infrastructure that was built on inherently insecure 
architectures, the US has begun to realize that it must quickly ramp up and seriously improve its cyber defense 
capabilities. Studying, learning from, and emulating Estonia’s cyber resiliency efforts can help to also reduce the US 
transition period in becoming prepared for a major cyber attack. This research begins first with structuring a functional 
hierarchy that helps define Estonia’s cyber policies, then progresses to determining the relative values of Estonia’s 
key cyber security improvement benchmarks, transitions next to a quantitative modeling process that helps to rank 
order cyber policies that have the most impact, and finally concludes with the introduction of an on-ramping 
framework that helps expedite organizational adoption and implementation. 
 
A Functional Hierachy for Systematically Benchmarking Effective Cyber Policies 
In order to benchmark the most critical and applicable portions of the 2014-2017 Estonian Cyber Strategy, this 
research begins with a functional analysis to identify those system functions and system interfaces that have the 
greatest potential to improve the US cyber security posture (Parnell, Driscoll, & Henderson, 2011). The functional 
hierarchy depicted in Exhibit 1 highlights those areas and functions that this research conjectures would be most 
helpful in rapidly maturing the the US cyber strategy through emulating and learning from what Estonia has already    
. 
Exhibit 1.  A Functional Hierachy for Analyzing Estonia’s Post-2007 Cyber Policies 
 




initiated for its cyber strategy. This functional hierarchy also provides this research with a clear plan of action and 
road map for analyzing the study’s fundamental goal: how to increase US cyber security by evaluating the post-2007 
Estonian cyber policies. This overarching goal, in turn, breaks down into two distinct functions—how Estonia has 
approached its domestic cyber policies and how it has navigated its foreign policies. Doing this permits the researchers 
to more easily compartmentalize the various interactions that define Estonia’s cyber plan. From these two functions, 
the researchers identify six sub-functions and objectives that are detailed in Exhibit 1 and comprise the critical tasks 
which govern the direction of the scope, analysis, and modeling for this study. 
Assigning the Relative Importance of the Sub-Functions and Objectives into a Swing Weight Matrix 
Recognizing that not all value measures have equal importance, the researchers employ the swing weight methodology 
to quantify the tradeoffs between multiple objectives (Parnell, Driscoll, & Henderson, 2011). The matrix in Exhibt 2 
shows how the researchers have come up with an assigned relative importance to each of the sub-functions and 
objectives in this study. The top side of the matrix defines the value measure importance and the left side defines the 
impact of changing the value measure range on the decision. Accordingly, this study arbitrarily scores 100 to the 
objective of Education and Awareness, located at the top left quadrant of the matrix, as the most important measure 
because it has the highest mission criticality and changes the most across its range of values, thereby providing the 
highest degree of variation. The arbitrary non-normalized scores—which are all below 100--for the remaining five 
other sub-functions and objectives are provided in Exhibit 2. What this matrix reveals is that this research has the 
Education and Awareness objective (with a score of 100) being weighted twice as much as the International 
Cooperation objective (with a score of 50) and being weighted five times as much as the Public and Private Sector 
Cooperation objective (with a  score of 20). The basic concept of this method in determining weights is relatively 
straightforward with those objectives with more importance having higher scores than those with less importance 
(Parnell, Driscoll, & Henderson, 2011). 
 
 Exhibit 2.  A Swing Weight Matrix for Quantifying Relative Importance of the 6 Sub-Functions and Objectives 
 
Value Models to Quantify Each of the Sub-Functions and Objectives 
In the next step of this study, the researchers construct value models for each of the sub-function and objective’s value 
measurements. The equations provided for each of the value models in Exhibit 3  represent the best-fitting line for 
each of the 6 value measurements. Exhibit 4 concisely summarizes the key information about the quantitative value 
model from both the swing weight matrix as well as the 6 value models for each of the sub-functions and objectives. 
Wong, Porter, Hokanson, et al. 
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Weight Best Fitting Equation
1.1  Cyber Security Ed. and Aware. Proxy Convex 100 0.274 y = 1.3393x3 - 3.8929x + 2.8571
1.2  Security of Private Sector Proxy Concave 70 0.192 y = -2.6607x2 + 31.95x + 4.1429
1.3  Coop. b/w Pri. and Pub. Sectors Proxy S-Shape 20 0.055 y = -0.1505x3 + 2.5694x2 - 0.7275x + 0.3968
1.4  Legal Changes Proxy Concave 90 0.247 y = -1.942x2 + 27.848x - 3.0357
2.1  Detecting Cyber Attacks Proxy Linear 35 0.096 y = 10x
2.2  International Cooperation Proxy S-Shape 50 0.137 y = 0.013x4 - 0.5845x3 + 5.7465x2 - 2.5926x + 0.2778
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Comparing US Cyber Security to Estonian Cyber Security and Recommending an On-Ramp Framework 
In the final step of this study, the researchers approximate the raw input data values to calculate how the overall US 
cyber policy weighted score compares against Estonia’s score. As highlighted in Exhibit 5, the US overall weighted 
score of 45.14 is below Estonia’s score of 76.95. While there may be concern that the US score falls below 50% of 
the Ideal Score, the researchers believe the overarching goal of this analysis is not to debate where the US falls in 
relation to other nations, but rather, to identify those key areas where the US can focus additional emphasis and 
resources to quickly improve its cyber security posture. The radar/web diagram in Exhibit 6 provides a more insightful                      
. 
Exhibit 5.  Comparison of Approximated US and Estonia Cyber Scores 
 
Exhibit 6.  Radar/Web Diagram Showing 2 Key Sub-Functions to Improve US Cyber Defense the Most 
 
 
assessment beyond the calculated overall weighted scores. In order to move US policy towards the ideal perimeter, it 
ought to focus on improving in two key sub-functions and objectives: Cyber Security Education and Awareness and 
Cooperation Between Private and Public Sectors. 
 In order to help the US more rapidly adopt and implement policies and activities that address these two 
objective shortcomings, this research proposes that the US ought to adopt a “fast-lane” on-ramping methodology. 
Exhibit 7 depicts two methods that vehicles normally on-ramp on to an expressway: either via the fast-lane or via the 
more traditional slow/merge-lane. Because the US has already adopted and implemented a number of cyber polices 
that Estonia recommends, indicating that it has studied and is learning from Estonia’s 2007 cyber attack, the US ought 
to have the capacity and capability to more readily implement additional measures to address its cyber defense 
shortcomings. The US has already implemented policies that target the low-hanging fruit most often seen in the slow-
lane; instead it now needs to go after the harder policies that drive cultural shifts and organizational paradigm changes.  
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Increasing Education and Awareness as well as the promoting Public and Private Partnerships are difficult 
undertakings that will require a whole-of-nation strategy. But to ensure the nation is ready for a cyber event along the 
scale of Estonia’s 2007 attack requires difficult and drastic change. The hope is that this research helps spur US policy-
makers to think of a “fast-lane” on-ramp strategy as a viable option for the cyber resiliency of the entire US. 
 





What makes Estonia supremely qualified to serve as an excellent benchmark for comparing cyber policies is that in 
April of 2007, it actually experienced a cyber-9/11 attack that fundamentally changed the way the entire nation 
approaches cyber security. This research acknowledges and affirms that the US has already adopted a number of 
domestic and foreign cyber security objectives that Estonia has proposed in its Cyber Security Strategy 2014-2017. 
However, this research concludes the US is deficient in two key objectives and recommends the US adopt a “fast-
lane” on-ramping strategy that addresses how to better educate its citizens on cyber threats and promote the public 
and private partnerships that are critically necessary to ensure a cyber resilient nation. Although increasing awareness 
throughout the US will be difficult, this is a challenge that deserves consideration if the nation does truly wish to 
improve its overall cybersecurity posture and reduce the attack vectors available to cyber adversaries. Additionally, 
with the US private sector outpacing the public sector in developing new and novel ways for defending and operating 
in cyberspace, it is critically important that the US Government leverage as much technical and operational expertise 
from its own technology industries and companies. By focusing efforts on these two key areas, perhaps then the US 
Wong, Porter, Hokanson, et al. 
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and its people will be more fully prepared to deal with cyber attacks as a normal part of being connected to the global 
economy rather than simply reacting to the consequences of a critical cyber event that takes the nation by surprise. 
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